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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DONALD H. MEYERS, and ENGINEERING )
)
ENTERPRISES, INC., d/b/a
INTERMOUNTAIN AERIAL SURVEYS,
)
)
Plaintiffs-Respondents, )
)
vs.
)
)
)
INTERWEST CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation; SKYCHOPPERS OF UTAH, )
a Utah corporation; and
)
SKYCHOPPERS OF COLORADO, a
)
Colorado corporation,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)

No. 17070

NATURE OF CASE
This is an action by plaintiffs to recover damages
for personal injury sustained to the plaintiff, Donald H.
Meyers and for loss of services and other expenses incurred
by the corporate plaintiff, Engineering Enterprises, Inc.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiff brought this action against the defendants, Interwest Corporation, a Utah corporation; Skychoppers
of Utah, a Utah corporation; and Skychoppers of Colorado, a
Colorado corporation.

Defendants Interwest Corporation and

Skychoppers of Utah have filed Answers to plaintiffs'
Complaint.
The third defendant, Skychoppers of Colorado , was
served with a Summons on August 8, 1978 and no Answer or
Default Certificate has ever been filed.

Defendant Sky-

choppers of Colorado's Motion to Quash Service was filed on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

August 7, 1980, more than 20 months after the original service.

Subsequent to defendant's Motion to Quash Service,

the plaintiffs also moved the court for an Order to Amend
the process contested by the defendant.

After hearing, in

which the Motions were argued, the court denied defendant's
Motion to Quash and granted the plaintiffs' Motion to Amend
the service.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant Skychoppers of Colorado's Interlocutory
Appeal seeks a reversal of the trial court's Order granting
plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and denying defendant's Motion
to Quash the process served upon it.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs' Complaint states a cause of action
against defendants for injuries sustained by the plaintiff
Meyers and damages sustained by the defendant Engineering
Enterprises, Inc. which arose out of a helicopter accident
that occurred in the State of Colorado on August 8, 1974.
Several negotiations were undertaken between the parties and
Complaints were finally filed on August 7, 1978.

Defendant

Skychoppers of Colorado was served in the State of Colorado
on August 15, 1978.

Nearly 20 months later, on August 7,

1980, Skychoppers of Colorado appeared specially and filed a
Motion to Quash the process served upon it.

Subsequent to

the filing of defendant's Motion, plaintiffs filed their own
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Motion to Amend process pursuant to Rule 4(h) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

The hearing on said Motion was

held before the Third Judicial District Court in and for
0

Salt Lake County, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft presiding.
The court entered its Order, on April 14, 1980,
denying defendant Skychoppers of Colorado's Motion to Quash
and granting plaintiffs' Motion to Amend the Summons to show
30 days rather than 20 days as the time for answering.
From said Order defendant Skychoppers of Colorado petitioned
for interlocutory appeal which was granted by this court.

ARGUMENT
POINT I:

RULE 4(h) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
MAKES AMENDMENTS TO PROCESS OR PROOF OF SERVICE
A DISCRETIONARY MATTER.
The trial court's decision to permit the amendment

of the Summons in this case was made pursuant to Rule 4(h)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which specifies as
follows:
At any time in its discretion and upon such
terms as it deems just, the court may allow
any process or proof of service thereof to
be amended . • • •
Rule 4(h) places within the discretion of the
court the determination of whether justice will be served
by allowing the amendment.

The intent of Rule 4{h) was

discussed in the case of Ballard v. Buist, 8 Ut.2d 308, 333
P.2d 1071 (1959).

The Ballard appeal was brought when the
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defendant's Motion to Quash service of Summons and to dismiss the Complaint was granted by the District Court.

In

that case the action was commenced by a minor prior to the
0

appointment of a guardian ad litem.

The guardian ad litem

then moved to amend the Summonses and Complaint to show the
prosecution of the claim by the guardian.

This court held

that the District Court erred in quashing service on the
grounds that the minor could not initiate the action and
thus the District Court never obtained jurisdiction.

The

court reasoned that the technical error was a mere irregularity which could be cured by amendment, though the act of
service, as characterized by defendant in this case, "was a
completed act."

Specifically, the court stated:

Although the court obtained jurisdiction when
the Summonses were properly served, such Summonses were subject to a Motion to Quash because of the provisions of Rule 17(b) • • •
. . . However, the fact that a minor must
appear by a guardian ad litem in a pending
suit does not mean that process issued in
initiating a suit by a minor makes such process void.
It is a mere irregularity which
can be cured by the appointment of a guardian
ad litem and
amendment.
333 P.2d at 1073.
(Emphasis adde .)

ba

Speaking concerning the court's discretion to
allow amendments pursuant to Rule 4(h), the court further
stated:
. . . The facts in the instant matter clearly
require the allowance of the requested amendment so that the matter may be heard upon the
merits.
The amendments could prejudice none
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of the parties, and could only tend to serve
justice. To disallow the amendment was an
abuse of discretion.
It has always been the
rule in this state to be liberal in the
allowance of amendment to the end there can
be a complete adjudication of the controversy
upon the merits and so that justice may be
served.
333 P.2d at 1074.
It is clear from the above-referred to case that
this court takes the position that mere mistakes in the process do not make the process void but merely voidable and
the subject of amendment to cure the defect.
The question of discretion exercised by a court of
law has been addressed by this court and other courts on
several occasions and it is undisputed in this jurisdiction
that where a court is granted discretionary authority to
perform a proposed action, that the reviewing court must
allow considerable latitude in which the court below may
exercise that judgment.

Further, it is undisputed law in

this jurisdiction that when a court has ruled on a discretionary matter that it shall not be reversed unless its
actions are clearly found to be arbitrary.

See Carmen v.

Slavens, 546 P.2d 601 (1976); Airkem International, Inc. v.
Parker, 513 P.2d 429 (Ut. 1973).
Many jurisdictions have made an attempt to define
an appropriate test to determine when a court has abused its
discretion.

The majority of the cases have concluded that

the appropriate test of abuse of discretion is whether the
trial court exceeded bounds of reason and the judicial
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action is arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable.

Marriage of

Connolly, 591 P.2d 911 (Cal. 1979); Trompeter v. Trompeter,
545 P.2d 297 (Kan. 1976).

Other courts have attempted to

refine the test further by indicating that judicial discretion is abused only when there is a finding that no reasonable man could take the same view adopted by the court below.
Essentially these courts have held that if reasonable men
could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the
court below, then it could not be said that the court has
abused its discretion.

State v. Wilkins, 556 P.2d 424 (Kan.

1976); Vickers v. Kansas City, 531 P.2d 113 (Kan. 1975);
Spingola v. Spingola, 580 P.2d 958 (N.M. 1978).
Based upon the facts of this case, it would be
impossible to conclude that the trial court exceeded the
bounds of reason, considering all circumstances and facts
before it.

The fact that the Summons was served upon the

defendant Skychoppers on August 8, 1978 and no Answer or
Default Certificate was filed prior to defendant's Motion to
Quash brought on April 7, 1980, some 20 months thereafter,
is evidence that the action taken by the court below has
produced the only equitable and just result available.

The

appellant's Motion could have been granted but was not
after full consideration by the trial court.

Accordingly,

the trial court's decision should not be disturbed.

POINT II.:

\THEN THE RETURt1 DAY OF PROCESS IS MISTAKENLY
OR DEFECTIVELY STATED, IT DOES NOT RENDER THE
PROCESS VOID BUT MERELY IRREGULAR AND MAY BE
AMENDED.
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The holding of this court in the Ballard case is
also clearly applicable to the instant matter by analogy.
Though Ballard, supra, concerned the defect in naming the
proper plaintiff, the reasoning of the court'.s holding is
clearly applicable in circumstances where the return day is
erroneously or mistakenly stated.

Again quoting from

Ballard:
The Sum~onses served upon respondents fully
informed them as to who the real party in
interest is, the nature of the action, the
name of the court in which they were to appear and the time within which to do so.
No disadvantage accrued to them from the
fact that the Summonses were brought in the
minor appellant's name • • • . 333 P.2d at
1073.
In the case before the court, the defect, which
was cured by amendment, was a misstatement as to the time
allowed for answering.

All of the other elements espoused

by the court in Ballard were present, i.e., the real parties
in interest were named, the nature of the action was given,
and the name of the court in which the parties were to respond was clearly stated.
A notable authority has commented in respect to
this type of defect as follows:
No general rule can be laid down as to the

effects of defects or informalities, with
regards to the appearance or return day in
a Summons or a Notice of Commencement of an
action in a court of record, because some
defects are held to render a Summons absolutely void and to invalidate all subsequent
proceedings in the action, while other defects are held to be simply irregular and

- 7 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

subject to amendment, and because the same
defect is held in some jurisdictions to be
fatal and others curahle.
It may be said,
however, that in the majority of cases considerin the fact that the return da of
process is mista en or e ective y stated,
the rule seems to be that it does not render the process void, but only voidable.
It seems generally agreed that a Summons
which is returnable in fewer than the number
of days provided by statute will be quashed
on Motion, although in many cases the courts
have held that a Summons returnable in less
than the required time is merely irregular
and may be amended or considered sufficient.
62 Am.Jur.2d Process §14 at 796-797.
{Emphasis added.)
The following authorities additionally support the
proposition that the defect, though subject to a Motion to
Quash, does not render the process void nor deprives the
court of jurisdiction.

See Flannery v. Kusha, 173 N.W. 652

(1919); Richmond and D.R. Company v. Benson, 12 S.E. 357
(Ga. 1890); Krueger v. Lynch, 48 N.W.2d 266 (1951); Lockway
v. Modern Woodmen, 133 N.W. 398 (1911); T. A. Howard Lumber
Company v. Hopson, 101 So. 363 (1924); Simmons v. Norfolk
and B.S.B. Company, 18 S.E. 117 (1893); Barker Company v.
Central West Investment Company, 105 N.W. 985 (1905); Gribbon
v. Freel, 93 N.Y. 93 (1883); Spokane Merchants Associates v.
Acord, 99 Wash. 674, 170 P. 329 (1918).
In the case of Lockway v. Modern Woodmen, supra,
the Minnesota Court answered the question here presented.
In that case, the Summons required the defendant to answer
within 20 days instead 0£ 30.

The statute that was
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applicable indicated that a Summons requiring less than 30
days for answering would not be valid or binding.

Neverthe-

less, it was held that the Summons was subject to amendment
0

to conform to the statute and defendant's Motion to Quash
was properly denied.
The statute in which the appellant relies is

§78-27-27, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), which
specifically precludes the entry of a default judgment prior
to the expiration of at least 30 days following service of
process.

Respondent has found no authority which would

mandate a conclusion that the above-referred to statute acts
to void service which mistakenly indicates that the served
party only has 20 days to respond.

As is stated in a prior

section, §78-27-22, Utah Code Annotated (1953):
The provisions of this act, to ensure maximum protection to the citizens of this
state, should be applied so as to assert
jurisdiction over non-resident defendants to
the fullest expended extent propounded by
due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The
purpose of the jurisdictional provisions ~
that act dictate that the construction of
the act should be made so that where at all
ossible
urisdiction of the court can exas it

This is an unusual and important case; unusual
because it does not involve the standard situation where the
defendant has failed to file his Answer and a Default Judgment is obtained against him.

It does not involve a

- 9 -
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situation where the defendant was served with the improper
wording in the Summons and promptly moves to have the service quashed or, if a judgment has been taken, to have that
judgment set aside.

It does not involve the situation where

a defendant through inadvertence or mistake neglected to
answer the Complaint served and a default judgment was taken.
This case, however, is a case which involves a defendant who
has participated in settlement negotiations for a period of
time in excess of 20 months, and who never filed an Answer
or moved to quash service of the Summons until after the
time period had run for issuing a new Summons in this matter.
This additionally involves a case in which the defendant has
now chosen to appear only after 20 months to quash the service originally considered by all parties to be valid.
This case is important because it involves public
policy arguments which if resolved in favor of the defendant
Skychoppers of Colorado, would make a mockery of the judicial process and it would allow defendants to take advantage
or procedural difficulties while at the same time inducing
an adverse party's inaction to their detriment.

If plain-

tiffs had not been induced into inaction on the Complaint,
the error or mistake would have been discovered and corrected prior to the time that a new Summons could no longer
be issued.

- 10 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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At first impression defendant's arguments have
some appeal; however, upon introspection, that appeal is
only cosmetic and only would represent a valid argument
should the defect in the Summons be necessary to invalidate
a Default Judgment against it.

Defendant-appellant has

analyzed its position not properly considering the realities
of the situation.

First the defendant-appellant has assumed

that the irregularities of the process are jurisdictional
and render the judgment void.

The cases relied upon by the

defendant-appellant on their face appear to support its
proposition.

However, a closer investigation indicates that

the defendant's failure to make a timely Motion has caused
the waiver of its rights to claim that the irregularities
rendered the service of process void.

None of the cases

cited by the defendant-appellant is on all fours with this
situation and can

b~

distinguished either by the fact that

the question presented to the courts does not include whether the defect constituted a void or voidable process and
in addition, in almost every case, the question was presented under the circumstances where a Default Judgment was
being contested.

This case differs factually and equitably

because no judgment or action was taken by plaintiff towards
default and by the discretion of the court, process was
amended.
Defendant-appellant's authorities simply do not
hold that the defects rendered the service of no effect but
even if they did, the defendant has waived any objection it
might have by failing to timely file a Motion to Quash.

- 11 -
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In

cases where defaults have been taken based upon a defective
Summons, which cases are more extreme than the instant case,
this court has held that a Motion must be timely raised or
it will be
(1881).

waived~

Miller v. Ziegler, 3 Ut. 17, 5 P. 518

The court in Miller justified its position by

stating:
Defendant should not be permitted to sit
quietly by and seek judgment against him by
default and then in the appellate court successfully ask that judgment be reversed for
the reasons that there was no service. 5 P.
at 520.
In that case, the court indicated that even where
a judgment had been taken, if the Motion was not timely
filed that the objection was waived.

In this case, where

the service did not result in a judgment, certainly the same
position would be equally true.

In all the cases cited by

the defendant-appellant the defect was raised promptly and
nowhere therein do any of the courts hold that the defect as
claimed rendered the service or a judgment automatically
void.

On the contrary, a better reasoned approach is that

such defect rendered the service and judgment voidable, unless amended, upon timely Motion.

In the case of Thomas v.

District Court of Third Judicial District in and for Salt
Lake County, 171 P.2d 667 (1946), which case appears to be
the principal case for this proposition in Utah, stresses
this requireraent of timeliness in such situations by holding
that the service should be quashed "when timely attacked by
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Motion.''

This reflects the view quoted by the court in

Thomas in the paragraph immediately preceding its holdings
that defective service, such as in the instant case, is
0

voidable and will be avoided by a Motion to Quash if made by
the defendant, but if not so avoided, a judgment rendered
thereon by default need not be set aside when attacked for
defects in the service.

171 P.2d at 677.

Rule 4(h) would be meaningless, if as defendantappellant contends, that such defects in the service made the
process automatically void.

There would be no need for the

discretionary grant to the court to allow amendment of such
process.
Defendant-appellant apparently relies heavily on
the case of Martin v. Nelson, 533 P.2d 897 (1975), in which
the court held service of process was defective because it
required an Answer in 20 days instead of 30 days.

Nowhere

is it stated in that opinion or any other opinion found
within the decisions of this court that such defect acts to
void the process.

It is admitted, by the amendment re-

quested, that the process was defective in that it stated 20
days for answering instead of 30.

The crucial question

becomes whether the defect could be cured by amendment as
is indicated in Rule 4(h).

Plaintiff-respondent points to

the arguments above and the case authorities cited for the
proposition that process was cured by amendment and that
defendant-appellant's Motion to Quash was properly denied.
- 13 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT III.:

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS NOT MISLED OR DISADVANTAGED BY THE MISTAKENLY STATED RETURN
DAY AND THUS IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF
SOUGHT.

It is the general rule of law that the effect of
misstating the return day depends to a considerable extent
upon whether the defendant was misled to its disadvantage
thereby.

Flannery v. Kusha, supra; Spokane Merchant's

Association v. Acord, supra; 62 Am.Jur.2d Process §15 at
798.

Defendant-appellants in their Brief and also in their

Petition for Appeal have made no allegations that they were
in any way misled to their disadvantage.

In fact, they

impliedly indicate that they were not aware of the defect
until 20 months after the original service had been effected.

All parties considered the process to be proper and

sufficient and had through mutual agreeMent, contemplating
settlement, not required the defendant Skychoppers of
Colorado to answer or otherwise plead.

The question left

begging in these circumstances is just exactly how the
defendan~

Skychoppers of Colorado was disadvantaged in these

circumstances where no action toward default was ever taken.
If anything, the plaintiffs-respondents would be the only
parties who could complain of being misled to their disadvantage.

If in fact the defendant Skychoppers of Colorado

did know of the defect and induced the plaintiff to not
require that an answer be filed and thus the defect be discovered, then of course the defendant Skychoppers of Colorado
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would be equitably estopped in raising the defense to the
process at this point in time.

If on the other hand, the

defendant Skychoppers of Colorado did not know of the defect,
or was not aware of the defect at the time, but s-till induced the plaintiffs into inaction, thus creating a situation where the defect was not discovered until after the
time in which new process could be issued, then only the
plaintiffs-respondents have been misled to their disadvantage and not the defendant in this matter.

Accordingly, if

there are any equities in this case at all, they lie in
favor of the plaintiffs-respondents.
CONCLUSION
The Order entered by the court below is clearly
supported by the case law and rules of procedure of this
jurisdiction.

Acting pursuant to discretionary power, the

court ruled, based upon justice and equity, that the process
served upon the defendant-appellant Skychoppers of Colorado
was defective yet curable by amendment.

There is no case

law or any other authority which can contradict this
position.
It must be assumed by the record on file herein
that the court considered all possible arguments that were,
or should have been raised by the defendant-appellant, and
that in the court's discretion, equity and justice were best
served by not allowing an extreme forfeiture to take place.
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Allowing the plaintiffs to amend their process and let
the matter be tried on the merits rather than be destroyed
by a technical deficiency is a proper result of this
controversy.

0

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs-respondents urge the court
to affirm the decision of the court below.
Respectfully submitted this

2 2-day of September,

1980.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
HAND-DELIVERED, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Plaintiffs-Respondents' Brief this
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84101.
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